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Immigration raids, employer collusion and the Immigration Act 2016 
In July 2016 Immigration Enforcement (a branch of the Home Office) raided a number of Byron 
burger branches throughout London resulting in the arrest and detention of 35 Byron workers. 
Byron cooperated with the Home Office raid by helping to arrange ‘arrest by appointment’ meetings 
for staff, informing workers that they had to attend health and safety meetings on ‘the dangers of 
cooking medium to medium rare burgers’. In light of Byron’s press release stating that the firm was 
under a ‘legal obligation’ to cooperate with Home Office officials,1 and following royal assent to the 
Immigration Act 2016 (which increases the enforcement powers of immigration officers), the first 
two sections of this article set out the legal limits on employers’ cooperation with Immigration 
Enforcement. In establishing that employers owe few duties to the Home Office, the final section will 
consider the competing duties owed between employer and employee, asking whether such duties 
override immigration obligations. 
1. The Byron ‘sting’ 
As a consequence of the immigration raid on Byron burgers, it was reported that 35 irregular 
migrants were arrested and a number of individuals were deported without the opportunity to say 
goodbye to their friends or families.2 Unlike other European countries such as Sweden, Greece, and 
Poland which have transposed the European Union (EU) Employer’s Sanctions Directive,3 the UK 
does not enforce the payment of unpaid wages for irregular migrants caught working without the 
right to work.4 Any contractual claims made by undocumented workers have also, up until now, 
been barred in domestic law by the doctrine of illegality on the ground that the contracts were 
illegal from inception due to the workers’ immigration status.5 As a result of this overarching legal 
framework, it is therefore possible that Byron extracted free labour from those arrested (if wages 
remained unpaid) whilst avoiding financial liability under immigration law due to their ‘cooperation’ 
with the Home Office. Stripping irregular migrants of their fundamental labour rights whilst allowing 
employers to escape financial liability thus heightens the legal vulnerability of those who are 
undocumented.  
In response to mass protests following the raids, Byron released a statement declaring that the firm 
was unaware that any of their workers were in possession of counterfeit documentation.6 Despite 
‘vigorous right to work checks’, Byron claimed that ‘sophisticated counterfeit documentation was 
used’ by the workers; meaning Byron had no idea that those individuals were without the right to 
work. Byron also claimed that they were under a ‘legal obligation’ to cooperate with the Home 
Office, suggesting that cooperation with immigration enforcement was mandatory as opposed to 
                                                          
1 Byron, ‘Home Office Investigation’ (Byron, August 2016) https://www.byronhamburgers.com/news/home-
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voluntary. So what are the legal obligations placed upon employers in these types of situations and 
was Byron’s collusion a ‘legal obligation’? 
2. Employer duties and sanctions 
Under the Immigration Act 2016 the enforcement powers of immigration officers have been 
strengthened and the circumstances in which an employer can be found guilty of employing ‘illegal’ 
workers have been broadened.  Section 35 of the Immigration Act 2016 thereby broadens the mens 
rea requirement under section 21 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 meaning it is 
now a criminal offence to ‘employ another person knowing, or where an employer has reasonable 
cause to believe, that the worker is disqualified from employment by reason of their immigration 
status’. Whereas the prior offence required actual knowledge of illegal working, liability will now 
arise where the employer has a ‘reasonable cause to believe’ that the worker is disqualified. Section 
35(4) of the Immigration Act 2016 also increases the criminal penalty for employing persons without 
the right to work under section 21(4) of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 from a 
maximum of three to five years imprisonment alongside a fine, or both. 
In parallel with the criminal offence, ‘civil penalties’ may also be imposed upon employers employing 
those without the right to work. The civil penalty consists of either a £15,000 or £20,000 fine per 
worker depending on whether it is a repeat offence, issued by way of notice.7 This differs from a 
criminal charge as civil penalties can be issued by Immigration Enforcement without having to bring 
the matter before a court, or prove that the employer knew, or had reasonable cause to believe, 
that the individual had no right to work. Where employers are found to be employing workers 
without the right to work, the civil penalty can be reduced if the employer agrees to cooperate with 
Home Office officials. A £5,000 discount, for example, will be made where employers report 
‘suspected illegal workers’ and a further £5,000 will be granted where there is evidence of ‘active 
cooperation’.8  
There is however a defence to the civil penalty under section 15(3) of the Immigration, Asylum and 
Nationality Act 2006 in the form of a ‘statutory excuse’, where an employer can show that they 
carried out the correct ‘right to work’ checks. This includes the re-checking of the workers status 
where they do not have a long term right to work in the UK. This ‘excuse’ will provide a defence as 
long as the employer has no knowledge that an individual is without the right to work throughout 
the entire period of employment. If a penalty notice is issued by the Secretary of State, an employer 
can thus object on grounds that the correct right to work checks were complied with. Such checks 
also eliminate the mens rea requirement for the criminal offence as the employer can demonstrate 
that they reasonably believed the individual had a right to work. In summary, this means that if the 
correct right to work checks are carried out by the employer, the employer need not fear criminal or 
civil sanctions as they have a defence against both types of action. As a result, the financial 
incentives for cooperation become meaningless where the statutory excuse can be used in an 
employer’s defence.  
Accordingly, although there is no legal obligation upon employers to carry out right to work checks, 
they are compelled to do so in practice due to the potential effects of the civil penalty and criminal 
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sanction. Where employers fail to perform the correct right to work checks or gain knowledge that 
workers have no right to work, their defence of a statutory excuse is lost making them liable in both 
civil and criminal law. Where knowledge is gained during the employment relationship, in order to 
avoid liability, employers are best advised to suspend the worker with pay for reasons of 
investigation or dismiss the worker following the correct procedures.9 
3. No duty to cooperate 
Given Byron’s stated ignorance, the claim that the firm was ‘legally obliged’ to cooperate with the 
Home Office is unfounded. If, as stated in their press release, Byron had performed ‘vigorous right to 
work checks’, the company would have possessed an adequate defence against the criminal charge 
and civil penalty as they could have raised a statutory excuse which would have alleviated them 
from paying any fines. Byron’s cooperation in setting up the raid was therefore voluntary, their 
motivations remain unclear. 
Where employers fail to conduct right to work checks and are without a statutory excuse, there is 
still no legal duty upon them to collude with Immigration Enforcement and set up ‘arrest by 
appointment’ meetings for staff. For these employers, the primary motivation behind collusion is 
financial: to avoid paying the full civil penalty and to receive a discount on their penalty for 
cooperation. The voluntary nature of cooperation is confirmed by paragraph 31.8 of the Home 
Office’s 2016 ‘Enforcement instructions and guidance’ which states that Immigration Enforcement 
officers should ‘try to enlist the co-operation of employers in identifying employees who may be 
immigration offenders…If unsuccessful, only undertake a visit where there is apparently reliable 
information that immigration offenders will be found’.  
Where employers refuse to cooperate, the ability of Immigration Enforcement officers to enter the 
business premises will depend upon their reasons for entry. Section 34(8) of the Immigration Act 
2016 increases the search powers of immigration officers where personnel records are concerned. 
Consequently an officer can enter and search for employee records where the officer provides 
identification and has reasonable belief that an individual has illegally entered or overstayed their 
visa, and that the individual has been ‘illegally working’ at the premises.10 In such circumstances, 
officers are able to enter the premises, seize employee records (other than those subject to legal 
privilege) and retain records if they are of value to the investigation. There is no general requirement 
however for employers to hand over staff records unless a specific request has been made for 
disclosure by the Secretary of State.11  
Where immigration officers seek to enter business premises in order to arrest an individual, as was 
the case with Byron, the officers must again have reasonable belief that the individual engaged in 
‘illegal work’ and must possess one of the following: a warrant; an ‘AD’ letter, which enables 
immigration officers to legally enter a business without a search warrant where authorised by a 
Home Office Assistant Director;12 or informed consent, meaning ‘a person’s agreement to allow 
something to happen after the person has been informed of all the risks involved and the 
                                                          
9 Ryan, ‘Employer Checks of Immigration Status and Employment Law’ in Costello and Freedland (eds) 
Migrants at work (OUP 2014). 
10 Section 28FA Immigration Act 1971. 
11 Section 134 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. 
12 Section 28CA Immigration Act 1971. 
alternatives’.13 The Home Office guidance on enforcement visits does not make clear from whom 
‘informed consent’ must be gained. What is clear however is that immigration officers have no 
independent statutory power to enter and search for immigration offenders unless they meet one of 
the three requirements set out above. As Byron helped the Home Office to set up ‘arrest by 
appointment’ meetings it appears as though consent was given voluntarily.  
Though the Byron raids attracted a great deal of media attention, Home Office data regarding 
immigration enforcement indicate that employer cooperation with Home Office officials is common 
and that Immigration Enforcement officers often threaten use of the civil penalty as a means of 
coercion.14 Research from the Anti-Raids network also raises concern over the issue of informed 
consent, as during their outreach work, the organisation found that many employers were unaware 
that signing consent forms was voluntary.15 This is particularly alarming given that in 184 sampled 
files examined by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders concerning immigration enforcement, 
authority for entry was primarily gained by informed consent (55%), whereas warrants permitted 
entry in only 43% of cases.16 This suggests that Immigration Enforcement officers are taking 
advantage of employers’ ignorance over enforcement policies, which correlates with concerns raised 
by the Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration in 2014. In his report, ‘An inspection of the use of 
the power to enter business premises without a search warrant’, the Chief Inspector notes 
numerous failings, including the unlawful use of the power of entry, widespread non-compliance 
with guidance, and weak justifications for entry.  
Although analysis demonstrates that employers’ obligations in terms of immigration enforcement 
are limited, numerous obligations are owed between employers and employees (or workers) as a 
result of the employment relationship. Consequently many commentators have asked whether the 
rights of the Byron workers could have offset the company’s ‘legal obligations’ with regards to 
Immigration Enforcement.17  
4. The rights of workers? 
Contractual claims 
Ordinarily the employment relationship gives rise to a number of duties on the part of the employer 
and employee, such as the duty of mutual trust and confidence which imposes obligations upon 
both parties not to undermine the trust and confidence required if the employment relationship is 
                                                          
13 Independent Chief Inspector of Borders, ‘An inspection of how the Home Office tackles illegal working, 2015. 
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illegal working’ 2015, figure 12. 
17 McAleavy, ‘Byron: Illegal working and employers duties’ (Solicitors Journal 15 August 2016) < 
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to continue.18 However, the enforcement of these duties is problematic where the worker has no 
legal right to work.  
This is primarily because up until now the doctrine of illegality invariably barred contractual claims 
by employees where the employee was relying on a contract which was illegal from its inception for 
reasons of immigration status.19 The illegality doctrine has recently been reformulated however by 
the Supreme Court in the case of Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42 in which Lord Toulson overruled the 
old case-law and applied a ‘range of factors’ test including, but not limited to: the weight of 
competing public policy considerations; the seriousness of the conduct of the parties; the centrality 
of the illegal conduct to the contract; whether the illegal conduct was intentional; and whether 
there was a marked disparity in the parties respective culpability.20 In theory this test provides more 
flexibility in permitting claims from undocumented workers; yet in practice, the public policy 
considerations may well point the other way, meaning illegality would remain a bar to contractual 
claims from undocumented workers, such as those raided at Byron. 
Relevant public policy factors that favour barring such contracts include: the creation of a criminal 
offence for ‘illegal’ working;21 the ability of the courts to confiscate wages as proceeds of crime;22 
and the UK’s rejection of the EU Sanctions Directive. Even where the range of factors approach is 
applied, it is therefore likely that the above public policies would endorse the strict application of the 
illegality doctrine as opposed to trumping it. Where workers are protected under statutes such as 
the Modern Slavery Act 2015 or the Gangmasters Licensing Act 2014 because, for example, they are 
trafficked, the public policy reasons may outweigh the illegality, permitting them to bring a 
contractual claim.23 Yet for undocumented workers who fall outside the scope of these protective 
statutes illegality will likely remain a bar to enforcing contractual rights. 
The duty of care in tort  
Employers owe a duty of care to employees and workers in respect of a safe working environment, 
adequate equipment and competent colleagues.24 This duty also extends beyond the physical health 
and safety of employees to psychiatric injury caused by stress, long hours, harassment or bullying, 
encompassing a number of different aspects of working life.25 In terms of immigration raids which 
are, in part, organised by the employer, an employee could claim for a breach of the duty of care if 
an identifiable psychiatric or physical injury develops as a consequence of the raid. Arguments 
against claims of this nature however might raise the remoteness of causation and the fact that such 
injuries were not reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of the employer’s actions.  
The doctrine of illegality also presents another barrier to bringing a tortious claim where there is an 
‘inextricable link’ between the facts giving rise to the claim and the illegality.26 For irregular migrants 
                                                          
18 Malik v BCCI [1998] AC 20. 
19 Hall v Woolston Hall Leisure Ltd [2001] ICR 99; Zarkasi v Anandita [2012] ICR 788. 
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21 Section 24(B(1) Immigration Act 1971. 
22 Section 24(B(5) Immigration Act 1971. 
23 see Hounga v Allen [2014] ICR 847, SC as endorsed in Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42. 
24 Wilson and Clyde Coal Ltd v English [1938] AC 57. 
25 Walker v Northumberland CC [1995] ICR 702. 
26 Hall v Woolston Hall Leisure Ltd [2001] ICR 99. 
working without the right to work, it is likely that injuries arising from immigration enforcement 
actions (such as raids) would be regarded as inextricably linked to their illegal status. Consequently 
the duty of care in tort offers very little protection to irregular migrants threatened with 
enforcement action in the workplace. 
Non-discrimination 
Another potential ground of protection for workers is protection from discrimination under the 
Equality Act 2010. The level of protection granted to irregular migrants under this Act however is 
called into question by the recent Supreme Court ruling in Taiwo v Olaigbe [2016] UKSC 31 which 
confirmed that immigration status does not fall within the protected characteristic of nationality. 
Employees that are targeted in the workplace on the basis of their immigration status (or suspected 
immigration status) will not therefore be able to make any claim under the Equality Act 2010. 
Employers should however proceed with caution in targeting particular members of staff as if there 
is any pattern which shows that workers of a particular nationality or racial or ethnic background are 
being targeted on grounds of immigration enforcement then this could lead to a discrimination 
claim.  Examples might arise where an employer makes certain assumptions about someone based 
on their accent or appearance and targets that person for right to work checks; where an employer 
submits information to the Home Office on the basis of a workers’ appearance or accent; or where 
sting operations are only conducted on individuals from a certain country. 
Data protection 
In a 2016 report by Corporate Watch,  concerns were raised over the release of personal data as  
leaked Home Office intelligence documents revealed that employers commonly hand over staff 
records to immigration officers, including detailed personal information such as home addresses.27  
As the majority of employers will be ‘data controllers’ they must comply with the provisions of the 
Data Protection Act 1998 in relation to all data held.28 The term ‘data controller’ is defined as ‘a 
person who (either alone or jointly or in common with other persons) determines the purposes for 
which and the manner in which any personal data are, or are to be, processed’.29 This can apply to 
any ‘person’ recognised in law which includes: individuals; organisations; and other corporate and 
unincorporated bodies of persons. Where an individual is given responsibility for data protection in 
an organisation, they will be acting on behalf of the organisation, which will be the data controller.30  
Under the Act personal data is defined as any recorded information about a living individual that can 
be identified from that data and other information which is in the possession of the data 
controller.31 Accordingly this would include staff records and employment files. Staff files may also 
contain ‘sensitive personal data’, as defined in section 2, which includes, for example, information 
concerning the racial or ethnic origin of the data subject or their commission, or alleged commission, 
                                                          
27 Corporate Watch, ‘Snitches, Stings & Leaks: how Immigration Enforcement works’ (Corporate Watch, 30 
August 2016) <https://corporatewatch.org/news/2016/aug/30/snitches-stings-leaks-how-immigration-
enforcement-works> accessed 5 September 2016. 
28 Section 4(4) Data Protection Act 1998. 
29 Section 1(1) Data Protection Act 1998. 
30 Information Commissioners Office, ‘Guide to data protection’ <https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-
to-data-protection/> accessed 23 September 2016. 
31 Section 1(1) Data Protection Act 1998. 
of an offence (such as an immigration offence). Note however that nationality is not included in the 
remit of racial or ethnic origin and thus falls in the general personal data category rather than that of 
sensitive personal data.32  
If employers (as data controllers) wish to fairly and lawfully share the personal data of their 
workforce, they must comply with all of Schedule 1 and one of the conditions set out in Schedule 2 
of the Act. Where sensitive personal data is concerned the employer must also meet Schedule 1, one 
of the conditions from Schedule 2 and one of the conditions in Schedule 3.  
An employer is lawfully allowed to share an employees’ personal data where necessary for the 
exercise of any functions of the Crown, a Minister of the Crown, or a government department, which 
would include the Home Office.33 It is unclear when it will be ‘necessary’ for an employer to release 
information to the Home Office as there is no obligation upon employers to release staff records 
unless a disclosure request is issued by the Secretary of State.34 Complications may also arise where 
general managers release information about employees or workers without the consent of the data 
controller. Under section 55 of the Data Protection Act 1998, it is thus a criminal offence to 
knowingly or recklessly, without the consent of the data controller disclose personal data or 
information. There are a number of exceptions to this offence as set out in section 55(2). This 
includes disclosing information where necessary for the purpose of preventing or detecting a crime 
(s55(2)(a)(ii)) or where the disclosing of information is in the public interest (s55(2)(d)).  
Given the complexities of data protection law, it is advised that employers and staff members 
carefully consider their obligations under the Act before handing over personnel files to immigration 
officers. As previously discussed, there is no legal obligation upon employers to hand over staff files 
or records outside of specific notice from the Secretary of State. Where employers refuse to 
cooperate however, Immigration Enforcement officials may enter and search the premises for 
personnel records and seize them if they are of importance to the investigation. 
5. Discussion 
As evident from the preceding analysis, where investigation and enforcement proceedings are issued 
against irregular migrant workers, the law affords the group minimal protection. This makes it easier 
for employers to cooperate with the Home Office as workers’ rights are readily undermined in law 
for reasons of immigration control. The notion that employers are under a ‘legal obligation’ to 
cooperate with Immigration Enforcement however, is false. Employers are under no obligation to 
permit entry or the searching of property, or indeed to collude in setting up sting operations in order 
to catch their own staff. Though the enforcement powers of immigration officers have been 
increased by the Immigration Act 2016, there is no legal authority obliging employers to assist with 
enforcement.  
As a result of the restrictions placed upon irregular migrants engaging in work, this group is 
prevented from enforcing rights with regards to: unpaid wages; holiday pay; injury to feelings; or in 
situations of mistreatment or discrimination based on immigration status (notwithstanding the 
situation of slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour under the Modern Slavery Act 2015). 
                                                          
32 Lord Williams of Mostyn, HL Deb 23 February 1998, vol 58, col 17GC. 
33 Data Protection Act 1998, schedule 2 para 5(c) and  schedule 3 para 7(1)(c). 
34 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, s 134. 
In light of the lack of available remedies facing workers who suffer discrimination on grounds of their 
immigration status, it has been suggested by Baroness Hale that Parliament consider broadening 
section 8 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 which allows for the reparation of compensation to 
victims.35 
Though the UK Government seeks to minimise illegal working within the UK, creating barriers to the 
enforcement of fundamental labour and other legal rights has the paradoxical effect of heightening 
the vulnerability of undocumented migrants making them more attractive to exploitative 
employers.36  As a means of overcoming these concerns, the Government has sought to create a 
‘hostile’ environment for illegal working by increasing the penalties and sanctions imposed upon 
employers. A new criminal offence of ‘illegal working’ has also been introduced by the Immigration 
Act 2016 which carries a maximum penalty term of six months imprisonment, or a fine, or both.37 
What the situation of Byron burgers demonstrates however, is that where employers cooperate with 
immigration enforcement, full responsibility for the ‘illegal working’ is transferred from the 
employer onto the worker as civil penalties are reduced or removed in exchange for cooperation. 
This is particularly significant as reports suggest that civil penalties are more commonly used as a 
form of deterrence than criminal sanctions, most likely because of the ease with which they can be 
issued.38   
Indeed in the 2010 report on the use of civil penalties by the Independent Chief Inspector of the UK 
Border Agency, the Inspector notes that rather ‘than being a deterrent to employing illegal 
workers…leniency and perceived passivity may actually have had the opposite effect. It most 
certainly did not constitute a “hostile environment” for employers of illegal workers’.39 
Consequently, whilst hostile policies are implemented upon irregular migrant workers, restricting 
opportunities for work and heightening exploitation,40 employers can avoid full financial 
responsibility through cutting a deal with the Home Office. The result is that employers, who have 
no legal duty to expose their staff to Immigration Enforcement raids, are incentivized to do so. In 
conjunction with the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, the Immigration Act 2016 thus 
reinforces a legal framework where employers who exploit their immigrant workforce can avoid civil 
liability through discounts on their civil penalties. The UK Government’s resistance to adopting the 
EU Employer’s Sanctions Directive alongside the strict application of the illegality doctrine also 
allows employers to avoid claims concerning minimum or unpaid wages. In light of these imbalances 
it is difficult to see how the current sanctions policy upholds the Government’s agenda of ‘reducing 
exploitation’.  
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